
How
do we turn it around? STRATEGY
This story was published in Editorial on Tuesday, July 30, 2002.
By Charles Rice
President, Rice Money Managers, Inc., 231 South Bemiston Ave Suite 800, Saint
Louis, MO 63105 314-854-1388
cmr@ricemoneymanagers.com
www.ricemoneymanagers.com
THE STOCK MARKET - STRATEGY
[Post-Dispatch Introduction:* Since March of 2000, the stock market has
lost nearly 45 percent of its value. Though it closed up again Monday, it
still has a long way to go to regain lost value and investor confidence.
Three analysts examine aspects of the crisis: How did the fall happen?
What change in corporate culture could help reverse the trend? What should
Washington do?]
Millions of Americans have, know it or not, invested according to the
"Random Walk Hypothesis" or the "Efficient Market Hypothesis." These
computer-based academic theories and the faith placed in them have been
powerful contributors to the stock market bubble and crash.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis assumes (1) All useful information about
stocks and the stock market is fully disclosed to investors and (2)
Investors deal with the information rationally. If those assumptions are
true, one does not have to worry about paying too much for stocks. The
efficient market will price stocks fairly. Risk becomes good; the more
risk you take, the more money you will make. And the theory is easy. Just
write your check.
The Random Walk Hypothesis assumes it is impossible to predict future
changes in stock prices, at least in the short run. If true, it is futile
to take any action in anticipation of possible future events. Stocks and
the stock market don't have trends. Buy and hold, or buy and suffer; it's
the best anyone can do.
Ironically, a strange intellectual leap sometimes follows. Though
investors are told that one can't predict what will happen tomorrow or
next week, "experts" have also claimed that risk and return years or even
decades into the future can be predicted.
Unfortunately, "hypothesis" is the key word in both cases. Both theories
have compelling factual, common sense and theoretical limitations and
flaws. Three examples: (1) Value Line and Standard & Poor's both claim
long run records of better-than-market stock selection, an impossibility
under Efficient Market. (2) Insiders are required to reveal their stock
trades precisely because they are considered better informed than
outsiders, not to mention recent accounting revelations! (3) Short-term
stock price fluctuations are definitely not random, exhibiting trends and
seasonal patterns impossible in random data.
But there is a deeper problem. Markets are about people, not just numbers.
What people believe about markets changes how markets behave. The more
people came to believe the theories or the sound bites based upon them,
the more dangerous and less accurate the theories became. Why? People
started throwing money at stocks regardless of value and with no plan for
protecting themselves by selling stocks or managing their stock market
risk. "Experts" assured them this was the wisest, shrewdest, safest thing
they could do!
At first, the new theories seemed to work. In a Ponsi-like effect, new
buyers crowded in and bid stocks up to even higher levels, which were,
after all, reasonable because "the market is efficient." Because "random
walk" proved "market timing doesn't work," there was a convenient excuse
to ignore early price declines.
Together the theories anesthetized investors to risk and endorsed
couch-potato investing. For most of the 20th century, assumptions about
the stock market were much more realistic. The title of a classic book, in
print since 1935, tells the story: The Battle for Investment Survival,
with the key words being "Battle" and "Survival."
Tax laws also contributed to the Bubble. They favor stock options over
wages as executive compensation and stock buybacks over ordinary cash
dividends. Some executives over-focused on stock prices because that makes
options valuable. Stock buybacks, arguably a manipulation of stock prices,
escalated. The long-term investor lost the risk reduction effect of
regular cash dividends, as money, some even borrowed, was directed to
buybacks rather than dividends.
The last few years have dramatically proved that people can pay too much
for stocks and that markets can trend, carrying most stocks with them.
This reveals the stock market for what it has always been, much more a
competitive game than a predictable profit machine. Approached with the
spirit that investment survival is a battle, it can be productive, but it
is never easy. Successful investors need to think and be ready to play
both offense and defense all the time.
Charles Rice is president of Rice Money Managers Inc.,231 South
Bemiston Ave
Ste 800, Clayton, MO 63105 314-854-1388
cmr@ricemoneymanagers.com . The foregoing is an expression of opinion
and should not be construed as investment advice.
Published in the Editorial section of the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch on Tuesday, July 30, 2002.
Copyright (C)2002, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch Reprinted by permission.